View access control as a matrix

Objects File 1 File 2 File 3

File n

Subjects

IDJECIS	User 3	-
---------	--------	---

User 1	read	write	-	-	read
User 2	write	write	write	-	-
User 3	-	-	-	read	read
User m	read	write	read	write	read

- Subjects (processes/users) access objects (e.g., files)
- Each cell of matrix has allowed permissions

Two ways to slice the matrix

- Along columns:
 - Kernel stores list of who can access object along with object
 - Most systems you've used probably do this
 - Examples: Unix file permissions, Access Control Lists (ACLs)

• Along rows:

- Capability systems do this
- More on these later...

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Outline	Example: Unix protection
	• Each process has a User ID & one or more group IDs
1 Unix protection	 System stores with each file (in the inode): User who owns the file and group file is in
2 Unix security holes	 Permissions for user, any one in file group, and other Shown by output of ls -l command:
3 Capability-based protection	- rw- rw- r dm cs212 index.html
4 Microarchitectural attacks	 Each group of three letters specifies a subset of read, write, and execute permissions User permissions apply to processes with same user ID Else, group permissions apply to processes in same group Else, other permissions apply
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Unix continued

Directories have permission bits, too

- Need write permission on a directory to create or delete a file
- Execute permission means ability to use pathnames in the directory, separate from read permission which allows listing
- Special user root (UID 0) has all privileges
 - E.g., Read/write any file, change owners of files
 - Required for administration (backup, creating new users, etc.)
- Example:
 - drwxr-xr-x 56 root wheel 4096 Apr 4 10:08 /etc
 - Directory writable only by root, readable by everyone
 - Means non-root users cannot directly delete files in /etc

- Many devices show up in file system
 - E.g., /dev/tty1 permissions just like for files
- Other access controls not represented in file system
- E.g., must usually be root to do the following:
 - Bind any TCP or UDP port number less than 1024
 - Change the current process's user or group ID
 - Mount or unmount most file systems
 - Create device nodes (such as /dev/tty1) in the file system

Non-file permissions in Unix

- Change the owner of a file
- Set the time-of-day clock; halt or reboot machine

Example: Login runs as root

- List of Unix users with accounts typically stored in files in /etc - Files passwd, group, and often shadow or master.passwd
- For each user, files contain:
 - Textual username (e.g., "dm", or "root")
 - Numeric user ID, and group ID(s)
 - One-way hash of user's password: {salt, *H*(salt, passwd)}
 - Should have tunable difficulty d: $\{d, \text{salt}, H_d(\text{salt}, \text{passwd})\}$
 - Other information, such as user's full name, login shell, etc.

• /usr/bin/login runs as root

- Reads username & password from terminal
- Looks up username in /etc/passwd, etc.
- Computes H(salt, typed password) & checks that it matches
- If matches, sets group ID & user ID corresponding to username
- Execute user's shell with execve system call

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Setuid (continued)

Examples

- passwd changes user's password
- su acquire new user ID (given correct password)
- sudo run one command as root
- ping (historically) uses raw IP sockets to send/receive ICMP

Have to be very careful when writing setuid code

- Attackers can run setuid programs any time (no need to wait for root to run a vulnerable job)
- Attacker controls many aspects of program's environment

Example attacks when running a setuid program

- Change PATH or IFS if setuid prog calls system(3)
- Set maximum file size to zero (if app rebuilds DB)
- Close fd 2 before running program—may accidentally send error message into protected file

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Other permissions

• When can process A send a signal to process B with kill?

- Allow if sender and receiver have same effective UID
- But need ability to kill processes you launch even if suid
- So allow if real UIDs match, as well
- Can also send SIGCONT w/o UID match if in same session

Debugger system call ptrace

- Lets one process modify another's memory
- Setuid gives a program more privilege than invoking user
- So don't let a process ptrace a more privileged process
- E.g., Require sender to match real & effective UID of target
- Also disable/ignore setuid if ptraced target calls exec
- Exception: root can ptrace anyone

Setuid

Some legitimate actions require more privs than UID

- E.g., how should users change their passwords? - Stored in root-owned /etc/passwd & /etc/shadow files

Solution: Setuid/setgid programs

- Run with privileges of file's owner or group
- Each process has real and effective UID/GID
- real is user who launched setuid program
- effective is owner/group of file, used in access checks
- Actual rules and interfaces somewhat complicated [Chen]

Shown as "s" in file listings

- --rws--x--x 1 root root 52528 Oct 29 08:54 /bin/passwd
- Obviously need to own file to set the setuid bit
- Need to own file and be in group to set setgid bit

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Linux capabilities

- Wireshark needs network access, not ability to delete all files
- Linux subdivides root's privileges into \sim 40 capabilities, e.g.:
 - cap_net_admin configure network interfaces (IP address, etc.)
 - cap_net_raw use raw sockets (bypassing UDP/TCP)
 - cap_sys_boot reboot; cap_sys_time adjust system clock
- Usually root gets all, but behavior can be modified by "securebits" (see prctl(2))
- Capabilities don't survive execve unless bits are set in both thread & inode (exception: ambient capabilities)
- "Effective" bit in inode acts like setuid for capability \$ ls -al /usr/bin/dumpcap -rwxr-xr-- 1 root wireshark 116808 Jan 30 06:23 /usr/bin/dumpcap
- \$ getcap /usr/bin/dumpcap /usr/bin/dumpcap cap_dac_override,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw=eip [Oops, cap_dac_override \approx root! neeeded for USB capture]
- See also: getcap(8), setcap(8), capsh(1)

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Outline

- Unix protection
- Unix security holes
- 3 Capability-based protection
- 4 Microarchitectural attacks

A security hole

- Even without root or setuid, attackers can trick root owned processes into doing things...
- Example: Want to clear unused files in /tmp
- Every night, automatically run this command as root: find /tmp -atime +3 -exec rm -f -- {} \;
- find identifies files not accessed in 3 days executes rm, replacing {} with file name
- rm -f -- path deletes file path
- Note "--" prevents path from being parsed as option
- What's wrong here?

An attack

find/rm

Attacker

mkdir ("/tmp/badetc") creat ("/tmp/badetc/passwd")

readdir ("/tmp") → "badetc" $lstat ("/tmp/badetc") \rightarrow DIRECTORY$ readdir ("/tmp/badetc") → "passwd"

unlink ("/tmp/badetc/passwd")

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An attack xterm command Provides a terminal window in X-windows Attacker Used to run with setuid root privileges mkdir ("/tmp/badetc") - Requires kernel pseudo-terminal (pty) device

- Required root privs to change ownership of pty to user
- Also writes protected utmp/wtmp files to record users
- Had feature to log terminal session to file

fd = open (logfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0666); /* ... */

• What's wrong here?

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xterm command

Provides a terminal window in X-windows

Used to run with setuid root privileges

- Requires kernel pseudo-terminal (pty) device
- Required root privs to change ownership of pty to user
- Also writes protected utmp/wtmp files to record users
- Had feature to log terminal session to file

if (access (logfile, W_OK) < 0) return ERROR;

fd = open (logfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0666); /* ... */

xterm is root, but shouldn't log to file user can't write

access call avoids dangerous security hole

- Does permission check with real, not effective UID
- Wrong: Another TOCTTOU bug

xterm command

Provides a terminal window in X-windows

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find/rm

creat ("/tmp/badetc/passwd")

readdir ("/tmp") → "badetc" $lstat ("/tmp/badetc") \rightarrow DIRECTORY$ readdir ("/tmp/badetc") → "passwd"

unlink ("/tmp/badetc/passwd")

Time-of-check-to-time-of-use [TOCTTOU] bug

- find checks that /tmp/badetc is not symlink
- But meaning of file name changes before it is used

rename ("/tmp/badetc" \rightarrow "/tmp/x") symlink ("/etc", "/tmp/badetc")

An attack

xterm

Attacker creat ("/tmp/log")

access ("/tmp/log") $\rightarrow OK$

unlink ("/tmp/log")

symlink ("/tmp/log" \rightarrow "/etc/passwd")

open ("/tmp/log")

- Attacker changes /tmp/log between check and use
 - xterm unwittingly overwrites /etc/passwd
 - Another TOCTTOU bug
- OpenBSD man page: "CAVEATS: access() is a potential security hole and should never be used."

Preventing TOCCTOU

Use new APIs that are relative to an opened directory fd

- openat, renameat, unlinkat, symlinkat, faccessat
- fchown, fchownat, fchmod, fchmodat, fstat, fstatat
- O_NOFOLLOW flag to open avoids symbolic links in last component
- But can still have TOCTTOU problems with hardlinks
- Lock resources, though most systems only lock files (and locks are typically advisory)

Wrap groups of operations in OS transactions

- Microsoft supports for transactions on Windows Vista and newer CreateTransaction, CommitTransaction, RollbackTransaction
- A few research projects for POSIX [Valor] [TxOS]

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SSH configuration files

- SSH 1.2.12 client ran as root for several reasons:
 - Needed to bind TCP port under 1024 (privileged operation)
 - Needed to read client private key (for host authentication)

Also needed to read & write files owned by user

- Read configuration file ~/.ssh/config
- Record server keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts

Software structured to avoid TOCTTOU bugs:

- First bind socket & read root-owned secret key file
- Second drop all privileges—set real, & effective UIDs to user
- Only then access user files
- Idea: avoid using any user-controlled arguments/files until you have no more privileges than the user
- What might still have gone wrong?

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A Linux security hole

Some programs acquire then release privileges

- E.g., su user is setuid root, becomes user if password correct

Consider the following:

- A and B unprivileged processes owned by attacker
- A ptraces B (works even with Yama, as B could be child of A)
- A executes "su user" to its own identity
- With effective UID (EUID) 0, su asks for password & waits
- While A's EUID is 0, B execs su root (B's exec honors setuid—not disabled—since A's EUID is 0)
- A types password, gets shell, and is attached to su root
- Can manipulate su root's memory to get root shell

Trick question: ptrace bug

- Actually do have more privileges than user!
 - Bound privileged port and read host private key
- Dropping privs allows user to "debug" SSH
 - Depends on OS, but at the time several had *ptrace* implementations that made SSH vulnerable

Once in debugger

- Could use privileged port to connect anywhere
- Could read secret host key from memory
- Could overwrite local user name to get privs of other user

• The fix: restructure into 3 processes!

- Perhaps overkill, but really wanted to avoid problems
- Today some linux distros restrict ptrace with Yama

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- Previous examples show two limitations of Unix
- Many OS security policies subjective not objective
 - When can you signal/debug process? Re-bind network port?
 - Rules for non-file operations somewhat incoherent
 - Even some file rules weird (creating hard links to files)
 - Lots of complexities when composing these policies
- Correct code is much harder to write than incorrect
 - Delete file without traversing symbolic link
 - Read SSH configuration file (requires 3 processes??)
 - Write mailbox owned by user in dir owned by root/mail
- Don't just blame the application writers
 - Must also blame the interfaces they program to

Outline Unix protection Setting: A multi-user time sharing system - This time it's not Unix 2 Unix security holes Wanted Fortran compiler to keep statistics - Modified compiler /sysx/fort to record stats in /sysx/stat Capability-based protection Gave compiler "home files license"—allows writing to anything in /sysx (kind of like Unix setuid) • What's wrong here? Microarchitectural attacks

Another security problem [Hardy]

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A confused deputy

- Attacker could overwrite any files in /sysx
 - System billing records kept in /sysx/bill got wiped
 - Probably command like fort -o /sysx/bill file.f
- Is this a bug in the compiler fort?
 - Original implementors did not anticipate extra rights
 - Can't blame them for unchecked output file
- Compiler is a "confused deputy"
 - Inherits privileges from invoking user (e.g., read file.f)
 - Also inherits privileges from home files license
 - Which source of authority is it serving on any given system call?
 - OS doesn't know if it just sees open ("/sysx/bill", ...)

Capabilities

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Su

Machine & programing environment built at CMU in '70s

Hydra [Wulf]

- OS enforced object modularity with capabilities - Could only call object methods with a capability
- Augmentation let methods manipulate objects
 - A method executes with the capability list of the object, not the caller
- Template methods take capabilities from caller
 - So method can access objects specified by caller

Slicing matrix along rows yields capabilities

- E.g., For each process, store a list of objects it can access
- Process explicitly invokes particular capabilities

Can help avoid confused deputy problem

- E.g., Must give compiler an argument that both specifies the output file and conveys the capability to write the file (think about passing a file descriptor, not a file name)
- So compiler uses no *ambient authority* to write file

• Three general approaches to capabilities:

- Hardware enforced (Tagged architectures like M-machine)
- Kernel-enforced (Hydra, KeyKOS)
- Self-authenticating capabilities (like Amoeba)

Good history in [Levy]

		File 1	File 2	File 3		File n
ıbjects {	User 1	read	write	-	-	read
	User 2	write	write	write	-	-
	User 3	-	-	-	read	read
	User m	read	write	read	write	read

Recall access control matrix

Objects

KeyKOS [Bomberger]

- Capability system developed in the early 1980s
 - Inspired many later systems: EROS, Coyotos
- Goal: Extreme security, reliability, and availability
- Structured as a "nanokernel"
 - Kernel proper only 20,000 lines of C, 100KB footprint
 - Avoids many problems with traditional kernels
 - Traditional OS interfaces implemented outside the kernel (including binary compatibility with existing OSes)
- Basic idea: No privileges other than capabilities
 - Means kernel provides purely objective security mechanism
 - As objective as pointers to objects in OO languages
 - In fact, partition system into many processes akin to objects

Unique features of KeyKOS

- Single-level store
 - Everything is persistent: memory, processes, ...
 - System periodically checkpoints its entire state
 - After power outage, everything comes back up as it was (may just lose the last few characters you typed)
- "Stateless" kernel design only caches information
 - All kernel state reconstructible from persistent data

Simplifies kernel and makes it more robust

- Kernel never runs out of space in memory allocation
- No message queues, etc. in kernel
- Run out of memory? Just checkpoint system

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KeyKOS capabilities

- Refered to as "keys" for short
- Types of keys:
 - devices Low-level hardware access
 - pages Persistent page of memory (can be mapped)
 - nodes Container for 16 capabilities
 - segments Pages & segments glued together with nodes
 - meters right to consume CPU time
 - domains a thread context
- Anyone possessing a key can grant it to others
 - But creating a key is a privileged operation
 - E.g., requires "prime meter" to divide it into submeters

Capability details

- Each domain has a number of key "slots":
 - 16 general-purpose key slots
 - address slot contains segment with process VM
 - meter slot contains key for CPU time
 - keeper slot contains key for exceptions
- Segments also have an associated keeper
 - Process that gets invoked on invalid reference
- Meter keeper (allows creative scheduling policies)
- Calls generate return key for calling domain
 - (Not required—other forms of message don't do this)

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KeyNIX: UNIX on KeyKOS

"One kernel per process" architecture


- Hard to crash kernel
- Even harder to crash system

• A process's kernel is its keeper

- Unmodified Unix binary makes Unix syscall
- Invalid KeyKOS syscall, transfers control to Unix keeper

Of course, kernels need to share state

- Use shared segment for process and file tables



KeyNIX overview

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Keynix I/O

Every file is a different process

- Elegant, and fault isolated
- Small files can live in a node, not a segment
- Makes the namei() function very expensive

Pipes require queues

- This turned out to be complicated and inefficient
- Interaction with signals complicated
- Other OS features perform very well, though
 - E.g., fork is six times faster than Mach 2.5

Self-authenticating capabilities

- Every access must be accompanied by a capability
 - For each object, OS stores random check value
 - Capability is: {Object, Rights, MAC(check, Rights)} (MAC = cryptographic Message Authentication Code)
- OS gives processes capabilities
 - Process creating resource gets full access rights
 - Can ask OS to generate capability with restricted rights
- Makes sharing very easy in distributed systems

IPC performance a losing battle with CPU makers

Capability systems usually involve many IPCs

Capability model never fully took off as kernel API

- Requires changes throughout application software

- CPUs optimized for "common" code, not context switches

Call capabilities "file descriptors" or "Java pointers" and people

People sometimes quip that capabilities are an OS concept of the

But discipline of pure capability system challenging so far

- Firefox security based on language-level object capabilities

- FreeBSD now ships with Capsicum, making capabilities available

- To revoke rights, must change check value
 - Need some way for everyone else to reacquire capabilities
- Hard to control propagation

will use them

future and always will be

But real systems do use capabilities

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Amoeba Limitations of capabilities

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A distributed OS, based on capabilities of form:

- server port, object ID, rights, check
- Any server can listen on any machine
 - Server port is hash of secret
 - Kernel won't let you listen if you don't know secret
- Many types of object have capabilities

- Files, directories, processes, devices, servers (E.g., X windows)

Separate file and directory servers

- Can implement your own file server, or store other object types in directories, which is cool

Check is like a secret password for the object

- Server records check value for capabilities with all rights
- Restricted capability's check is hash of old check, rights

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Outline

Capsicum [Watson]

• Capability API in FreeBSD 9

• cap_enter enters a process into capability mode

- Can no longer use absolute pathnames, "...", etc.
- cap_new turns file descriptors into restricted capabilities
 - \sim 60 individual permissions can be restricted per capability
 - E.g., disallow fchmod (which works on read-only fds)
- Used by various base system binaries
- Supported by a growing number of applications
- Patches exist to use Capsicum for Chrome's sandboxing

- Unix protection
- 2 Unix security holes
- 3 Capability-based protection
- 4 Microarchitectural attacks

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Cache timing attacks

const char *table;

```
int
victim (int secret_byte)
{
   return table[secret_byte*64];
}
```

Accessing memory based on secret data can leak the data

• Approach 1: Flush/Evict + Reload

- Share table with victim process (shared lib or deduplication)
- Flush table from cache (clflush instruction, or overflow cache)
- After victim, time reads of table, fast line tells you secret_byte

Approach 2: Prime + Probe

- No shared memory, but attacker primes cache with its own buffer
- Victim's table access evicts one of attacker's cache lines
- Slow cache line (+ cache mapping) reveals secret data

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Spectre attack [Kocher]

unsigned char *array1, *array2; int array1_size, array2_size;

```
int lookup (int input)
ſ
  if (input < array1_size)</pre>
   return array2[array1[input] * 4096];
 return -1;
7
```

 Say attacker supplies input, wants to read array1[input] - input can exceed bounds, reference any byte in address space

- Ensure array1 cached, but array1_size and array2 uncached
- Flush+reload attack on array2 now reveals array1[input]
 - CPU will likely predict branch taken (don't usually overflow)
 - Speculatively load from array2 before seeing array1_size
 - Reloaded cache line reveals array1[input]

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Mitigation

- Replace array bounds checks with index masking (used by Chrome)
 - return array2[array1[input&0xffff] * 4096]
 - Limits distance of bounds violation
- Place JavaScript sandbox in separate address space
- XOR pointers with type-dependent poison values (in JITs)
 - Branch mispredictions on type checks XOR wrong values
- Make CPUs a bit better about leaking state through side channels
- Insert "gratuitous" memory barriers to prevent speculation on sensitive data
- Unfortunately general solution still an open problem

Speculative execution key to performance

```
unsigned char *array1, *array2;
int array1_size, array2_size;
int lookup (int input)
  if (input < array1_size)
   return array2[array1[input] * 4096];
 return -1;
```

CPU predicts branches to mask memory latency

- E.g., predict input < array_size even if array1_size not cached
- Wait to get array1_size from memory before retiring instructions
- Squash incorrectly predicted instructions by reverting registers
- But can't revert cache state, only registers

Example: intel Haswell

ľ

- Specutatively executes up to 192 micro-ops
- Indexes branch target buffer by bottom 31 bits of branch address

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Many more variants of Spectre

- Attack on JavaScript JIT
 - Malicious JavaScript reads secrets outside of JavaScript sandbox
- eBPF compiles packet filters in kernel (e.g., for tcpdump) - Can generate code to reveal arbitrary kernel memory
- Can even use victim code that's not supposed to be executed
 - Mistrain branch predictor on indirect branch
 - Speculatively execute arbitrary "spectre gadget" in victim process
 - Same cache impact even if gadget execution entirely squashed
 - Has been used to leak host memory from inside virtual machine
- Use other speculation channels
 - E.g., CPU predicts that previous store does not conflict with a load